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How does one define Japanese? If a person is Japanese, what exactly does that mean? Is 
it anyone who is a legal citizen of Japan? Is it someone who is ethnically Japanese, regardless of 
whether they live there or not? Does it matter whether they are full Japanese or only half? If they 
can speak the language? If they know Japanese manners and customs? And are all these people 
the same level of Japanese or are their “tiers" of sorts? Is an ethnically Japanese person living in 
the U.S. more or less Japanese than a U.S.-born expat who gains Japanese legal status? What 
would those people consider themselves? Does everyone with Japanese heritage consider 
themselves Japanese? Does everyone who lives in Japan get to be Japanese? What if they don't 
want that label?   
These are the sorts of questions that are constantly debated and opinions on them vary 
greatly, but this question of who is and is not Japanese has a great deal of consequence, 
especially for those on the margins who may be Japanese by one definition and not by another. 
With this in mind, I'd like to discuss some of the historical changes in the prevailing definition of 
“Japanese" and how those shifts relate to the experiences of Japan's often overlooked minority 
groups.  
Japan is not a very diverse country when compared to places like the U.S., but there are a 
variety of groups within Japan that differ to varying degrees in terms of ethnicity and culture 
from the majority group. For various reasons, even many Japanese people are unfamiliar with 
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them and their histories. The image of Japan as monoethnic exists both within and without the 
country (Lie 2001; Sugimoto 2010, 3-5, 9, 196; Murphy-Shigematsu 2008, 284-85). Part of this 
is because most of the minorities within Japan are still East Asians, and many find it easier to 
pass as Japanese and just get on with their daily lives. However, they do still face discrimination, 
and the fact that there is so little awareness can make it difficult for them to advocate for 
changes.   
When examining these groups, there is some difficulty at the outset because the Japanese 
government does not collect data on ethnicity in their official census (Lie 2001). Thus, no one 
knows for sure what the ethnic makeup of the nation of Japan actually is. The numbers available 
are all approximations, but the general estimate is that around 5% of the total population (6-7 
million people) are non-majority Japanese (Sugimoto 2010, 8, 198; Willis and Murphy-
Shigematsu 2008, 12). The only concrete number available is the official register of foreign 
nationals—a count of 2.25 million—but this official number does not include those who entered 
illegally or who overstayed their visas (Sugimoto 2010, 218-19; Willis and Murphy-Shigematsu 
2008, 11).  
The main groups to discuss are the Burakumin, the Ainu, Okinawans, Zainichi Koreans, 
Haafu, and New Migrants. These groups all have a different relationship to the majority: some 
are indigenous groups, some are foreign nationals and their descendants, and some are 
marginalized populations within the majority ethnicity.   
Burakumin 
The Burakumin, literally “hamlet people,” are the largest minority group in Japan. They 
are not ethnically distinct from the majority Japanese population, but they are believed to have 
“impure” bloodlines based on their residency in certain Buraku areas (Cangià 2012, 361). 
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Official Japanese government estimates state that there are 4,000 Buraku areas and 2 million 
Burakumin, but due to ongoing debates between the government authorities and some 
community members, it is likely that the true number is closer to 6,000 Buraku and 3 million 
Burakumin (Cangià 2012, 361; Sugimoto 2010, 7, 204). Most of these Buraku are located in 
rural parts of the Kansai region and other parts of Western Japan (Samuel 2008, 181; 183). 
 Discrimination against the Burakumin is historically predicated on their traditional 
occupations, and ill feelings toward certain jobs may date back centuries. The official 
classification of the groups that are now considered Burakumin are usually attributed to the Edo 
Period caste system put in place by the Tokugawa Shogunate. The imperial family was above the 
system, and the four main groups below them were the samurai, farmers, artisans, and 
merchants, in that order. Below them and outside of the formal system were two groups: the Eta 
(“the defiled”) and the Hinin (“nonhumans”) (Sugimoto 2010, 205). The Eta were considered 
impure by both Buddhist and Shinto standards because they dealt in trades involving blood and 
death, such as butchering, leatherwork, and undertaking. The Hinin were made up of street 
performers, lepers, criminals, and prostitutes, among other such social outcasts. Both groups 
were legally distinct from the rest of society and were forced to live in set districts. The cast 
system required individuals to marry within their group and carry out their designated jobs, 
leaving the Burakumin restricted to their “defiling” work. The descendants of the Eta and the 
Hinin make up today’s Burakumin, who are still identified based on their living in those 
designated districts (Samuel 2008, 181-183). 
 The Meiji Restoration brought an end to the formal Tokugawa caste system, and in 1872 
both the Eta and the Hinin, at the time numbering around 400,000 people, were declared dōwa 
(“same Japanese”) and incorporated into society as the Shin Heimin (“new commoners”) 
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(Samuel 2008, 182). Despite this abolishment of the legal basis of discrimination, the Shin 
Heimin continued to face problems. In some cases their situation was worsened by becoming 
Shin Heimin, because the government effectively eliminated the monopoly they had once held 
over certain occupations such as shoemaking, leaving them vulnerable to competition that further 
exacerbated their poor economic condition. This change in their status also sparked violence 
against Burakumin by members of what were formerly the classes above them. 
As Japan industrialized and modernized during the Meiji Restoration, the Buraku areas 
lagged in terms of education, communication, and transportation. This left the Burakumin in a 
poorer state than the rest of the Japanese, and even now most of them are more impoverished, 
less educated, and less healthy than other Japanese because of the persistent poverty and 
discrimination that they face (Samuel 2008, 183). This discrimination follows them even if they 
choose to move out of the Buraku, because Japan’s Koseki (family register) paperwork requires 
them to report their hometown. The Buraku label on their Koseki papers leaves them vulnerable 
to discrimination in any situation where such papers are required, such as when applying for a 
job (Samuel 2008, 183). Companies have been known to circulate lists of known Buraku areas in 
order to blacklist potential hires from those places, and families have often hired private 
investigators to make sure that potential spouses are not secretly Burakumin who would 
“pollute” their family bloodline (Cangià 2012, 261; Sugimoto 2010, 206). 
 Burakumin have a long history of collective organization and political activism (Samuel 
2008, 183-185). The most prominent group is the Buraku Liberation League, which has been 
responsible for many of the political gains of the Burakumin, including several “special 
measures” that included government financial support to designated Buraku areas (Sugimoto 
2010, 208-09). These measures, along with the overall growth of the Japanese economy that 
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occurred in the post-WWII era, markedly improved conditions for the Burakumin. However, the 
“special measures” have incurred backlash from the majority Japanese. The Burakumin activists 
have always used rhetoric that cast the Burakumin as no different than other Japanese, so 
opponents reasoned that if they really were the same there was no justification for them receiving 
special treatment from the government. As a result of this argument, many of the “special 
measures” have since been dropped. 
 Today, Buraku areas are still home to their traditional leatherworking industries, but 
many also work in other “undesirable” occupations such as construction (Cangià 2012, 261). The 
ethnic makeup of the Buraku is changing as well, as ethnic Koreans, Chinese, and new migrants 
from other parts of Asia are moving to these marginalized industry towns to find work. In many 
cases, these foreign minorities face similar barriers to those of the Burakumin, though the 
historical reasoning is different. This has caused some impediments to community formation, as 
increasingly the people living in Buraku areas may not share the same historical ancestry that is 
generally cited as the source of their collective identity.  
In any case, while there is little prestige and heavy stigma surrounding the work they do 
and the place they live, the services and goods provided by the Burakumin are needed by the rest 
of Japan. Community activism has capitalized on this fact, often by encouraging Burakumin 
children to be proud of the fine crafts that the Buraku industries create, such as leather bags and 
drums. Similarly, a boost in the popularity of “traditional” Japanese crafts and arts have allowed 
Burakumin to revive traditional cultural practices such as monkey training and special types of 
puppetry that were avoided for years because of the stigma. In both cases these cultural products 
are cast as being “traditional Japanese,” rather than as Buraku, strengthening claims to an 
“ordinary Japanese” identity (Cangià 2012, 362-64; 369-70). 
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The primary struggles of the Burakumin remain tied to economics and their relatively 
impoverished conditions. Their neighborhoods have chronically low property values, hindering 
efforts to move to nicer areas. They lack the funds to afford the private tutors and afterschool 
programs that could help their children get ahead in Japan’s intense education system. The older 
generations don’t have the education to seek out jobs in more respected industries. As Japan’s 
economy continues to stagnate, opportunities for growth that could improve Buraku conditions 
remain elusive. They remain economically disadvantaged, geographically separated, and 
stigmatized by those outside. 
 
Ainu 
The Ainu are historically Japan’s most distinctive ethnic minority group. They live 
predominantly in northern Japan, though there are some living as far north as Russia and some 
further south into Honshu, and are traditionally a forager culture (Hanazaki 2001, 118). They 
never developed a unified political system, and thus they had trouble resisting intrusions by the 
more politically organized Japanese. A series of military conflicts occurred starting in the 1400s, 
which resulted in repeated losses by the Ainu (Hanazaki 2001, 117). The Ainu gradually came 
under the influence of trade and a wage-labor system that benefitted the Japanese, and thus their 
traditional culture had begun to erode long before their land, at the time called Ezo, was formally 
incorporated into the Japanese nation as the prefecture of Hokkaido (Hanazaki 2001, 118-20). 
Their long history of contact with the Japanese also resulting in a significant amount of 
intermarriage and subsequent mixed ancestry individuals, and at present very few “pure” Ainu 
individuals remain. Like with other indigenous populations, contact with the Japanese also 
reduced the Ainu population through the introduction of diseases. 
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Being a northern people, the Ainu are generally more stocky and hairy than their 
Japanese neighbors, and this phenotypical difference is often the means of identifying a person 
as Ainu (“Ainu” 2005). Given the history of intermarriage cited above, this visual identification 
can exclude many people who would consider themselves to be Ainu despite not “looking” Ainu. 
The visual distinctions are also more prominent in males. Ainu women formerly had very 
distinctive tattoos but these are no longer common. 
Once made a part of the Japanese empire during the Meiji Restoration, the Ainu were 
subject to a variety of assimilation efforts (Sjöberg 2008, 199; Sugimoto 2010, 217). They were 
made to use Japanese names, wear Japanese clothes, and live in Japanese houses despite the deep 
religious symbols present in their traditional homes (Hanazaki 2001, 120). The schools set up for 
Ainu children taught them only Japanese, and thus the Ainu language fell out of use, with only a 
handful of people remaining who know more than a few words. The Ainu were also strongly 
encouraged to take up farming, despite them having no history and in many cases no interest in 
agriculture (Sjöberg 2008, 199). The 1899 Hokkaido Aborigine Protection Act was the 
centerpiece of this assimilation effort; it promised to give land and money for public works if the 
Ainu would take up farming and become self-sufficient, but the land they were given was poor 
quality and they were often not given as much as was promised, leaving them unable to sustain 
themselves. Many used a loophole in the law to lease their land to Japanese farmers and 
eventually they lost ownership of it. Overall, farming was less economically beneficial than the 
wage labor they had been doing as lumberjacks and construction workers (Howell 2004). 
Furthermore, those that refused to take up farming were given no aid. Like other marginalized 
groups, the Ainu are poorer and less well-educated than the majority population (Sjöberg 2008, 
204). 
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While many of the Ainu happily assimilated, others sought to preserve their culture and 
advocate for more rights as an indigenous group. The global civil rights movements of the 1960s 
and 1970s prompted many Ainu to reach out to other indigenous groups and begin actively 
seeking more recognition from the government (Hanazaki 2001, 125; 127; Sjöberg 2008, 197). 
The Ainu were not legally recognized as an indigenous group until a 1997 court case over the 
building of a dam near the Ainu settlement of Nibutani (Maruyama 2012). In this case, the judge 
ruled that the Ainu had a right to enjoy their own culture and that the government had violated 
this right by not fully considering the impact of the dam they had built on the Saru River.  
Official government estimates put the number of Ainu at 24,000, but this number 
includes only those living in known Ainu settlements in Hokkaido and thus excludes people who 
live in other cities or regions, as well as many people of mixed ancestry and those who choose to 
hide their Ainu background to avoid discrimination (Sugimoto 2010, 216-17). Other estimates 
suggest a total Ainu population of closer to 200,000. Regardless of these number, the Ainu are 
routinely cast by both the media and academics as a “dying culture” that has few remaining 
members, and many of the majority Japanese severely underestimate the number of Ainu and 
know little about their history or culture (Lie 2001, 46; Sjöberg 2008, 200). Efforts have been 
made by Ainu activists to create museums of Ainu culture as well as Ainu language schools, but 
their remains something of a debate over whether the museums and displays of traditional crafts 
are too “touristy” (Hanazaki 2001, 125-26; Sjöberg 2008, 199; 202-03; 209-10; 212). 
Authenticity debates aside, these efforts are often successful at keeping the younger Ainu 
engaged with their traditional culture, and they also serve to give peace of mind to the older Ainu 
who are worried about their culture fading away. 
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Ryukyu Islanders/Okinawans 
 The Ryukyu Islanders, often called Okinawans after the largest of the islands and the 
name of the encompassing Japanese prefecture, were formerly an autonomous kingdom with a 
distinct culture. The Ryukyu Island chain stretches from the southern tip of Kyushu to Taiwan, 
with the largest island in the center, equidistant from both China and Japan (Pearson 2001). This 
geographical marginality kept the Ryukyu Islanders outside either country’s domain, though they 
have a history of contact and trade with both. Ties with China helped give the Ryukyu monarch 
legitimacy and boosted the kingdom’s maritime trade. The islands came under control of Japan’s 
Satsuma domain in the early 1600s, but the kingdom remained somewhat autonomous to allow 
for trade to continue with China. The islands were formally annexed by Japan in 1879, at which 
time its ruling monarchy was dissolved. 
 With annexation came assimilation efforts, but these efforts were generally more gradual 
than those imposed on the Ainu in the north who lacked the Okinawan’s political organization 
(Hanazaki 2001, 121). The primary means of assimilation was the government education policy, 
which included nationalist rhetoric and indoctrination into the emperor cult that promoted the 
unity of all people under Japanese rule. The Japanese schools also failed to teach the children 
their native language, though there was and remains today debate over whether native Okinawan 
speech is a separate language or a distant dialect of Japanese. The traditional native speech is 
largely unintelligible to majority Japanese, but some insist that is it merely a Japanese dialect, 
thus reinforcing the view that Okinawans are Japanese and thus should be controlled by Japan. 
The Japanese administration set Japanese as the standard language of business, media, and 
education in the prefecture, thus weakening the distinctive traditional speech. Gradually, 
Japanese cultural practices became more dominant. 
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 From the outset Okinawa was perceived as something of a buffer zone between Japan and 
the surrounding countries, and this became especially poignant during the Pacific War. A third of 
the Okinawan population died when the United States invaded the islands in 1945, with a fourth 
of the population perishing at the Battle of Okinawa alone (Ueunten 2008). Many of these deaths 
were forced suicides, as the Japanese soldiers encouraged or outright forced civilians to commit 
suicide rather than be taken prisoner.  
After the war and the subsequent occupation of Japan, the United States maintained 
control of Okinawa until 1972, using the islands to stage Cold War-era proxy wars in Asia (Hook 
2010). During the U.S. occupation, many Okinawans activists used rhetoric tying the Okinawans 
to the Japanese in an attempt to convince Tokyo to advocate for the islands’ return to Japanese 
control. Since ’72, this rhetoric has fallen out of use as the Okinawans frequently feel that Tokyo 
is once again treating them as a buffer zone rather than as sovereign citizens (Hanazaki 2001). 
75% of the U.S. military presence in Japan in located in Okinawa prefecture, and the citizens 
complain of the noise and pollution from the military activities, as well as the potential for 
accidents, such as when a U.S. military helicopter crashed into an Okinawan university 
classroom. There is also outrage over crimes committed against the Okinawans by U.S. 
servicemen, often against women and children, including high-profile kidnappings and rapes of 
Okinawan girls.  
The response of the Japanese government and U.S. military leaders to these incidents and 
concerns has been largely insufficient and sometimes callous. The Okinawans have since begun 
emphasizing their historic ties with China and their status as Pacific Islanders, sometimes calling 
their chain “Yaponesia” to bring attention to their similarities to other Pacific groups (Hanazaki 
2001, 129). Many politicians and activists have begun calling for more autonomy or outright 
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independence from Japan, and there are longstanding protests against military expansions on the 
islands that could threaten the safety and environment of its people. 
Despite widespread opposition to the U.S. military presence and animosity toward the 
Tokyo government, the Okinawan economy is almost entirely bound to the military (via jobs on 
the bases or providing services to the personnel and their families) and to tourism from other 
parts of Japan (Taira 2008, 278-79). As much as they would like to have the bases gone, to do so 
would put many Okinawans out of work. The overall situation here is complex and varied, and 
no one solution will satisfy all involved. 
 
Hāfu 
 The term Hāfu refers to people of mixed Japanese ancestry. The term is predominantly 
used to refer to people of partially Western descent, and rarely applies to people who are 
partially Asian, such as Japanese-Koreans. Some see the term as being derogatory, arguing that it 
describes Hāfu as being somehow incomplete, but it remains the most commonly used term. 
Some have proposed the use of the term “Double” instead, but this label does not accurately 
describe the experiences of many Hāfu individuals (Murphy-Shigematsu 2008, 286-89). 
Hyphenated ethnic labels, such as those used in the US, are not commonly used in Japan. 
 Experiences among Hāfu vary widely based on individual circumstances. One of the 
main factors is whether a Hāfu individual spent time in both parents’ home country (Murphy-
Shigematsu 2008). Some are truly “Double,” having lived in Japan and their other home country, 
learning the culture and language of both. Others were raised solely in Japan, and may or may 
not have cultural ties to their other side. Still others were raised abroad, and may or may not have 
been taught Japanese at home. All of these people would have a different experience living in 
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Japan; a “Double” may miss out on some deeper cultural traits due to their switching back and 
forth but have an advantage due to their bilingual status, a Japan-only Hāfu may feel discouraged 
when people on the street constantly treat them as foreign, and a Hāfu who goes to Japan after 
living abroad may feel that they missed out by not engaging with their Japanese heritage earlier 
(Murphy-Shigematsu 2008, 282-83). 
 While Hāfu have undoubtedly existed for as long as Japanese and non-Japanese people 
have been in contact with each other, the Hāfu boom, so to speak, began with the U.S. 
occupation of Japan at the end of WWII. Many of the women who married or had children with 
Americans were seen as somehow traitorous for “joining the enemy;” the loss of Japanese 
women to American men was considered to be another emasculating aspect of the occupation 
(Murphy-Shigematsu 2008, 288-89). Acceptance in their Japanese families often hinged on how 
“Japanese” they looked, with those with dark hair and eyes having an easier time fitting in than 
those with lighter hair or darker skin. 
 In more recent years, the wartime stigma has faded, but there remains a notion of there 
being a “pure” Japanese standard and any Hāfu is a clear violation of this rule. They encounter 
problems simply because they are different, and the wide variety of circumstances surrounding 
them means that there is no clear way to categorize them and their experiences. 
 
Zainichi Koreans 
According to government statistics, Japan has a population of around 400,000 ethnic 
Koreans, most of whom are second- and third-generation residents (Sugimoto 2010, 209). These 
Zainichi Koreans, or Koreans in Japan, vary in their level of connection to their ethnic homeland. 
Some attend Korean-language schools and participate in Korean community groups, while others 
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prefer to “pass” as Japanese by using Japanese names and language exclusively or while in 
public, taking advantage of the fact that they look no different from ethnic Japanese people 
(Kashani 2006, 181; 183; Kyo 2008, 57). For many of the Zainichi, their Korean identity only 
became significant when it was used to justify discrimination against them, most often in terms 
of marriage, housing, and jobs (Kyo 2008, 47; 59). Because Japanese citizenship is passed on 
through one’s parent’s citizenship, rather than by virtue of being born in Japan, these Koreans 
lack legal status as Japanese nationals, leaving them without many civil rights and protections. 
Their status as Korean is marked by their paperwork or lack thereof, which is why discrimination 
against them occurs in contexts like housing where they must show official papers (Sugimoto 
2010, 211).  
Koreans residents do have the option to become naturalized citizens if they choose, but 
historically this process required them to give up their Korean name, effectively telling them to 
abandon their Korean heritage in exchange for Japanese legal status (Sugimoto 2010, 211). This 
rule has since been changed, but some Koreans still refuse to naturalize based on principle; they 
still feel that to naturalize would be to abandon their Korean identity (Kyo 2008, 49). Many 
Koreans have naturalized throughout the years, but because the Japanese government does not 
collect data about the ethnic composition of its citizenry, once Zainichi Koreans naturalize and 
become legal Japanese, they are no longer counted officially as Zainichi Koreans (Sugimoto 
2010, 209). Thus, the figure of 400,000 cited above is likely an underestimate, as it does not 
include naturalized Koreans or their descendants. It also fails to take into account individuals 
who are part Korean due to intermarriages with ethnic Japanese. 
 The Korean Diaspora in Japan began after Japan invaded and annexed Korea in 1910. 
Annexation made Koreans part of the burgeoning Japanese empire, and also granted them legal 
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status as Japanese subjects (Caprio and Jia 2009, 27; Kashani 2006, 169-72). Korea was less 
developed economically than Japan at the time, so some Koreans took the opportunity to migrate 
to the main Japanese islands to find jobs in Japan’s flourishing industrial sectors. This out-
migration was also encouraged by the fact that most of the prime farmland in Korea was being 
taken by Japanese settlers (Kashani 2006, 171). 
Due to their lack of Japanese language ability and their perceived status of being inferior 
to Japanese, the work they did was in dangerous and unstable jobs such as mining and railroad 
construction (Kashani 2006, 172-73). These early migrants established networks based on 
kinship and regional identity, with many Koreans coming from the same parts of Korea settling 
together in Japan. Once established, these networks facilitated further migration along the same 
lines (Kashani 2006, 172).  
Koreans in Japan faced discrimination and had limited economic prospects. After the 
1923 Kanto Earthquake struck, Koreans in Japan were accused of poisoning wells in the 
aftermath, sparking a campaign of violence that left thousands of Koreans dead at the hands of 
xenophobic Japanese (Kashani 2006, 176-77). As the Japanese war effort expanded in later 
years, a massive labor shortage formed as most of the Japanese men joined the army. The 
Japanese government decided to fill the shortage by forcing Koreans to move to Japan to work 
(Caprio and Jia 2009, 27; Kashani 2006, 172). In addition to these forced laborers, many Korean 
women, as well as women of other nationalities, were forced to work as prostitutes for Japanese 
soldiers.  
When the war ended and Japan lost control of its colonies, Koreans living in Japan lost 
their status as Japanese citizens (Sugimoto 2010, 211). Many Koreans, especially those forced to 
move to Japan, were eager to return, but a shortage of jobs, food, and housing in Korea kept 
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many would-be returnees in Japan where their prospects were somewhat brighter. Some of those 
who did go back later returned to Japan, spreading the news about Korea’s situation among their 
neighbors. Rules set up for migration, including limits on the amount of money they could bring 
along, further hindered return migration (Caprio and Jia 2009, 21-22; 26; 28-29; 32; 35-38). The 
ideological split between North and South Korea also caused problems. Most Zainichi were from 
the geographic south, but many held leftist and communist sympathies and thus supported the 
North politically. Leftist Koreans would face imprisonment or worse if they retuned to the South, 
and thus they opted to remain in Japan (Caprio and Jia 2009, 22-23; 30-31; 33). Overall, of the 
2.3 million Koreans in Japan at the end of the war, 1.7 million returned and 600,000 stayed in 
Japan (Lie 2001, 24). 
 Koreans remaining in Japan had to choose between identifying as North or South 
Koreans, and this formed the basis of the two largest Korean community groups, the South-
oriented Mindan (the Korean Residents Union in Japan) and the North-oriented Chongryun (the 
General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) (Sugimoto 2010, 2010). These organizations 
form the basis of efforts to preserve the ethnic identity of later-generation Zainichi, often by 
operating Korean schools so that Zainichi children can learn the Korean language, history, and 
cultural practices. Korean families frequently promote in-group marriage and frown upon 
intermarriages with ethnic Japanese, but this attitude has been loosening among younger 
generations of Zainichi (Kyo 2008, 51-55; Sugimoto 2010, 212-13). 
 Koreans in Japan still face limited job prospects, with many of them remaining in the 
unstable manual labor sectors that their predecessors began in. Many opt to open their own 
businesses and become successful restaurant and pachinko-parlor owners (Sugimoto 2010, 215).  
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 Recent nationalist movements have targeted Koreans specifically, as they are the largest 
minority group seen as foreign (there are technically more Burakumin than Koreans, but they are 
seen as essentially Japanese and thus are not as strongly targeted) (Sugimoto 2010, 215-16). 
Some nationalist groups protest the “special treatment” that Koreans receive and demand that 
they “go back” to Korea, despite the fact that most Zainichi have never been to Korea and speak 
little to no Korean. Those that do go to Korea find themselves still cast as outsiders due to their 
being linguistically and culturally Japanese (Kyo 2008). Neither fully Korean nor fully Japanese, 
the Zainichi find themselves caught between two identities and unable to claim either entirely. 
 Protests against the Zainichi often coincide with tensions between Japan and the Korean 
countries. One of the thorniest issues between the two is the wartime forced prostitution of 
Korean women, often referred to as “comfort women” (Lie 2001, 25). Japanese leaders have 
sometimes denied that the women were forced, causing outrage in Korea and in other countries 
that are home to victims.  
Japanese leaders have also tended to downplay Japan’s aggressive actions during the 
colonial period, usually by saying that Japan was trying to modernize the rest of Asia and save 
them from Western domination (Driscoll 2009). High-profile leaders, including current Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe, have made calls for Japan to stop apologizing for the war and move on, 
despite the victims of Japan’s aggression calling for more sincere apologies.  
New Migrants 
 According to the official registry, Japan has a population of around 2 million foreign 
nationals, 1.63% of the total population. This number has been rising—the figure was 0.98% of 
the population in 1991 (Sugimoto 2010, 218-19). 74% of these foreigners are from other parts of 
Asia, and 18% are from South America. Of course, these numbers only count those who came to 
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Japan along official channels; missing from these figures are those that entered Japan illegally or 
who entered legally but overstayed their visas. 
 In Japan, there is a general divide between the “old migrants” such as the Koreans and 
Chinese whose ancestors came to Japan before or during the Pacific War, and the “new 
migrants” who have come to Japan since the 1980s (Sugimoto 2010, 219). The new migrants 
arrived as a result of Japan’s economic growth; as the Japanese people have become more 
affluent and the Japanese economy has expanded, there has been a growing shortage of labor in 
the blue collar “3K” sectors—jobs such as construction work that are kitsui (“difficult”), kitanai 
(“dirty”), and kiken (“dangerous”) (Lie 2001, 10). Japan’s rapidly aging and shrinking population 
worsens this problem, both because there are not enough new people entering the workforce and 
also because the growing number of elderly Japanese necessitates a larger number of caregivers 
and other medical staff (Willis and Murphy-Shigematsu 2008, 8).  
Some estimates state that between 380,000 and 600,000 migrants would need to come to 
Japan annually to maintain current population levels, but opposition remains from right-wing 
leaders who feel that such large numbers of migrants would alter Japan’s status as an ethnically 
and culturally homogenous nation (Willis and Murphy-Shigematsu 2008, 7). Efforts to boost 
immigration are also hindered by public perception of Japan as a homogenous nation and a fear 
that bringing in foreign migrants could disrupt the “traditional harmony” of Japanese society. 
The government, finding itself trapped between an economic need for increased 
immigration and public opposition to that potential increase, allowed for two “loophole” 
channels to allow for some migration (Willis and Murphy-Shigematsu 2008, 7). One was a 
change in the migration law that allows the descendants of Japanese living abroad to migrate to 
Japan fairly easily. This has created a substantial population of Nikkeijin, mostly from South 
Holbrooks 18 
America. The logic was that the Nikkeijin, who are ethnically Japanese, would be able to 
assimilate more easily that migrants from other countries (Sugimoto 2010, 221). This, however, 
proved not to be the case; the Nikkeijin are culturally and linguistically South Americans, and, 
like other migrants, due to their lack of Japanese language skill they find themselves stuck in the 
3K sectors regardless of their educational background. The population of South American 
Nikkeijin has been declining in recent years, largely because the economies in their home 
countries are improving. Those still in Japan rarely agitate for an improvement to their 
marginalized position because they fear losing their “special status” within Japan’s migration 
law. 
The second channel allowed by the government was the creation of the Technical 
Internship Trainee Program (Yamaga-Karns 1995). While this program is marketed as a way for 
foreign workers to gain skills, in reality it served to provide Japanese companies both large and 
small with cheap labor. Most of these trainees come from other parts of Asia, and because of 
their status as “students,” they lack the legal protections that other laborers have. Because of this, 
rights violations against the trainees are common, with many forced to work long hours at low 
pay, live in cramped company housing, and may have their passports or other IDs taken to 
prevent them from leaving the company. This is all after enduring a long wait to become trainees 
in the first place, and many of them take on significant debt in the process. 
Furthermore, these trainees are not the only migrants subject to rights abuses. Like 
migrants to other countries, language barriers and other structural problems hinder migrants from 
seeking legal recourse for abuses (Sugimoto 2010, 220; Willis and Murphy-Shigematsu 2008, 8). 
Many fear bringing attention to issues at all, for fear of being deported or revealing that they 
overstayed their visa.  
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At a more personal level, how individual migrants are treated in personal interactions is 
often dependent on how their home country is viewed in Japan. A person from Europe or the 
U.S. is seen as high class because they came from a rich country, while a person from the 
Philippines or Pakistan is seen as backwards or uneducated because they came from a third-
world country (Lie 2001, 20-21). To cope with their situation, migrants frequently try to claim a 
Japanese identity; they will talk about liking traditional Japanese foods like natto that are 
unpalatable to most foreigners or liking Japanese music or sports teams (Onishi 2008). Others 
will identity more strongly with their home country such as by becoming more religious. Still 
others are caught between the two, unable to identify strongly with either. Those that return 
home to visit are often thought to have somehow abandoned their home and may face stigma.  
The prevailing stereotypes about certain nationalities remain problems regardless of how 
things actually are. Chinese migrants are often linked to crime in the media, while women from 
the Philippines and Indonesia are cast as barmaids and other types of “entertainers” despite more 
of them coming to Japan to be the wives of farmers or to work in nursing and caregiving for the 
elderly (Lie 2001, 11-14). 
The Consequences of the Monoethnic Myth 
Before and during World War II, Japan cast itself as the “big brother” of Asia. They were 
going to be head of the Greater East Asian co-prosperity sphere that was going to protect Asia 
from Western dominance (Lie 2001, 24). Everyone was welcome (albeit as colonies) but there 
was a clear effort to incorporate diverse people under the label of Japan (Befu 2008). That is not 
to say that there was not discrimination on the individual level by any means, but officially at 
least everyone was welcome.  
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After the war and the collapse of the empire, Japan folded in on itself. They were no 
longer the big, expansive eastern empire anymore. They were just a set of islands. They 
redefined themselves to fit their new role, and in this process they ignored the realities of 
multiculturalism that existed. They looked at countries like the United States that were “diverse” 
and decided that was not what Japan was (Lie 2001, 25-26). They cite race riots and protests in 
the U.S.  and associate diversity with conflict.  
Because many of Japan’s minority groups are invisible or pushed to the margins, the 
Japanese as a whole do not have to confront the diversity that exists because they cannot see it, 
or they choose not to. It will take a conscious effort of education—and of coming to terms with 
their past actions—before this can change. In all these cases acknowledging that minority groups 
exist would entail acknowledging that Japan wronged them, and that can be a hard thing for 
people to admit, both as individuals and as a collective government (Murphy-Shigematsu 2008, 
285). Some small steps have been taken, and progress is not outside the realm of possibility. It 
will take work, and it will be uncomfortable, but it needs to be done. 
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